an informal intro to linguistics 2k18: Rules (part 3)

The topic of this post is rules. What kinds of rules? Well, rules about how language is governed. Governed? As in having a monopoly over violence? While rules of language are frequently spoken of, the topic of in what sense language is governed by rules is far less discussed. I will present a couple of claims answering the question, namely:


  1. Rules are descriptions of what can happen in systems (including languages)
  2. Descriptions may be prescriptions, when used to describe some ideal state


The first point is more of a definition than a claim, but I nonetheless call it a "claim" because it may run against common usage of what a "rule" is. The second point directly addresses an issue linguists have made for themselves that you are likely to find in any introductory linguistics textbooks.

The problem with rules


Let's begin with how we typically think of "rules". The common sense notion of rules where I come from are commandments about what you can't do. The "grammar police" may issue commandments such as:


Conventional linguists are quick to point out that these prescriptive rules about language use aren't so much directly about how language is actually used, but rather are stylistic imperatives. Good writers, I hear, often break such rules. So the linguists laugh, hahahaha the reign of the grammar police dies with descriptivism... 

The clever linguist points at the very reason we have to have a "rule" like thou shalt not begin a sentence with the word 'but' is for the very reason that people DO this. So, rather than making up empty injunctions about how people may or may not use language, we ought to describe how people use language. So, turning the previously given commandments around, we get:




Now, where the clever linguist went astray is making a normative claim against normative claims; the ought not state ought's but rather ought to state is's is an ought. Rules, according to many linguists ought to be descriptive. Why is this so? (see the first part of this series for more info on that 😎) If "rules" are just supposed to be descriptive, why even call them rules? Why not call them something else, like... ...try "descriptions" or "formulas" or something like that?

Things are getting unruly...


Many of the ideas just presented were first put forth about the confusion over "rules" in the context of linguistics by Roy Harris in various books and articles. Linguists, unfortunately, have gone down in social science history as being especially toxic to one another in many matters. This topic has been explored in many volumes, such as a book by another fellow named Harris in The Linguistic Wars (R.A. Harris 1993).

One difficulty with talking about language, I think, is that it is something everybody uses language (though, perhaps to varying degrees; a topic for another post). Therefore, it is difficult to come to talking about language from a "blank slate"; it is difficult to return to First Principles talking about language because we have so many thoughts about it already.

But, we are seeking Truth, so we are willing to take that path. In order to find a path of peace, let us clear our heads and establish what exactly we mean by rules. There is freedom in order. I will show you a way whereby rules may be both descriptive and prescriptive




...then after establishing some principles and talking on the same terms, we can turn to tearing apart bad arguments, calling out authors (oh dear am I included in this?!) on unfounded claims, and relentlessly pruning bullshit 👺



Reestablishing Rule


In the previous post, I offered a definition of language, which I'll restate here: language is what is intentional and systematic in communicationLanguages (plural), in turn, are those individual systems of communication. The notion of counting languages, bilingualism, and other matters of what having more than one language means will be taken up in the next post.

A grammar is a description of a language. We might also talk about grammar (c.f. a grammar) as that which is systematic in a language, as opposed to a description or theory trying to capture that system. That is, a grammar made up by linguists (or computers, or some unholy alliance) attempts to capture the grammar of some language. Many (all?) grammars may be defined in terms of lexical items and rules. Lexical items here, can roughly be understood to be the "words" or individually meaningful units of a language. Rules are formal descriptions of how lexical items and other rules interact.

Rules about what?


As grammars are theories made up by people, they can include or omit things that we talk about in a common usage of "language". For example, one might write a grammar of English that makes no reference to meaning, but is solely a syntactic description explaining what word orderings are "possible" (this would be modelling a very strong version of the principle of the "autonomy of syntax"). In such a grammar, all we would need to know about a word like cat is that it patterns with other words in a particular way. We might assign cat to a class "Noun" and show how it behaves according to identical constraints as other words like dog, which also belong to that same class.

Similarly, a grammar of English might consist of lexical items with lots of meaning information. One might say that the sentence, "trees are angry" is unacceptable because trees don't think or feel, so they can't be angry. Such information might be represented in a fancy-shmancy way like:

@Noun{rock,
  animate  = "False"
  living   = "False"
}
@Noun{tree,
  animate  = "False"
  living   = "True"
}
@Noun{cat,
  animate  = "True"
  living   = "True"
}
...

...in a text file representing the words a speaker of a language knows (their lexicon). We could then have a rule for a phrase like "____ are angry" that requires the thing in the blank to be both plural and animate.

Such a lexical item plus rules framework for describing a language is general, and need not correspond to things we think of as words and sentences. We could come up with a very simple language consisting of the lexical items {A, B} and the rule "X or XX", where X can be any of the lexical items. There are more formal ways to represent lexical items, rules, etc. but these details are not necessary to see the overall, higher level picture here. The permissible sentences in this language are therefore,

A
B
AA
BB

...but not AB, BA, AAA and so forth. As they appear in the strings {"A", "B", "AA", "BB"}, the individual A's and B's are called tokens of the lexical items A and B.

When we check if a certain string (e.g. "A", "AA", "AAB"...) belongs to a language, we must parse it. In this context, this means that we see if from the lexical items and the rules in our language we can generate that string. Our rule allows us to get "A", and "AA", but not "AAB". So, we say that "AAB" in ungrammatical because our rules disallow us from generating it.

The ideas about rules just discussed here are very general. The grammar describing the language {"A", "B", "AA", "BB"}, where language is understood to mean a set of strings (compatible with my definition, but more narrow/formal), could very well be a grammar for how your pet dog likes dog food. Suppose you observe the following facts:

Doggo accepts the following orders: one can of food A, one can of food B, two cans of food A, or two cans of food B; nothing else. 

Could you come up with a (formal) model for this phenomena?

Rules are made to be broken


From our lived experiences, I think we can agree that Doggo as well as humans talking to each other on a day to day basis are likely not to strictly follow rules which we can nicely describe in elegant formalisms. The Doggo example does not describe any reality I know of. Dogs don't count two can-fulls of food as far as I know. They might eat all the food you give them, or 1.7234398 cans of food, or whatever other amount. A model like first describing Doggo's diet as {"A", "B", "AA", "BB"} and then trying to find some order behind that pattern may be an interesting and useful thing to do. But at the end of the day, it is a model to be refined as we acquire more data and learn more about the world.

What happens when we don't follow grammatical rules ? One thing we know that doesn't happen is people's heads blowing up and complete breakdown of communication. This is one area where human 'natural' language differ from things like computer programming languages. Programming languages have strict syntactic requirements about what statements are well-formed. Any violation of these rules will result in some kind of SYNTAX ERROR.



Parsing Problems


Unlike the definitions of formal systems like computer programming languages, human communication systems are constantly being negotiated, augmented, redefined, edited, etc. For example, we know, that language has mechanisms for adding new signs to a code. Using a phrase like "this is called _______" (while holding up some object or pointing to something) in English demonstrates one way in which language is creative. Rather than being a fixed system with only a finite number of possible form meaning combinations (like a traffic lights are programmed to be), the introduction of new signs into a linguistic system ("a language") and the use of novel combinations of existing signs is the norm of language use.

We can choose to look at or model human languages as static systems that don't change, but in practice, we know they do. And, I think this doesn't have to do with words. 'll take it on faith that human beings can also learn new (grammatical) rules. I likewise believe that people can learn foreign languages. (These claims are empirically testable; as long as we come up with testable definitions of what "knowing a language" means). Maybe I'll treat these topics in another post if the readership expresses interest in these things 😉

Resolving Prescription and Description


Having sketched an account of what rules are in language, we can bury this prescription vs description polemic that some linguists have killed thousands of trees over in the past hundred years or so.

Depending on what sort of grammar we are writing, rules can be either prescriptive (telling people what to do) or descriptive (telling how people do things).

For instance, we can write a grammar describing how to produce (generate) elegant English prose, and posit rules to follow to do that. We can evaluate the quality of this grammar based on how well it allows a user that applies its recommendations to succeed at writing beautifully. Similarly, we can write a descriptive grammar on how Californians talk. It can take up the noble task of describing just when and where (northern) Californians insert the word "hella" into their speech.

There is no contradiction in calling rules descriptions but also saying they can be prescriptive, because there is no a priori restriction in the universe on trying to describe an ideal state. Descriptions of ideals thus can be construed as prescriptions.

One ironic twist of the position that "rules are descriptive statements about languages", is that when we learn foreign languages, the is becomes the ought. The descriptive fact about how native speakers say things becomes a commandment about how you need to talk. You must talk in this way to sound native! That is, descriptive rules are regularities in the (linguistic) behavior of certain people, which become prescriptive to people that don't already follow them (e.g. because they are learning that language as a foreigner). This is starting to sound like playing a board game with a dishonest five year old that wants to win by changing the rules.

So you can have your prescription and eat your description too.

Evaluating grammars


Now that you have walked (read) this path thus far, you are in the position to stand firm and evaluate grammars. Wielding the sword of objective measurements, you may evaluate how well grammars account for the data they say they describe. And opening your third eye of intuitive judgment you may use your piercing gaze to see some models "interesting" while regarding others as "fruitless symbol shuffling".

Here's a quick start of a terrible model. Suppose I started defining English like...

Okay, so English is the set of all acceptable sentences according to native English speakers. I am a native English speaker. Let me begin telling you what English is. For each of sentence of English, we will make a rule. From the top! 
Aardvarks ate.
Aardvarks ate apples.
Aardvarks ate antarctic apples.
Aardvarks ate antarctic apples a priori.
[...]

How might this grammar fare on judgment day?

I see that you have given me the sentences I was looking for. Well, some of them at least. I don't have the time to go through your infinite babbling. Is there (literally) no end to your enumerating of specifics? 
You haven't given a very interesting account of how English "fits together". You hypocrite and impostor. You dodge the sword of objective measurement by matching your model exactly to the data, but do so without rules? The unruly will not stand.
This grammar is unfit to say the daylight of publication.

Indeed the grammar given above isn't very informative. Even a simple characterization of words according to parts of speech (noun, adjective, preposition, etc.) is theoretically leaps and bounds ahead of the hypothetical uninformative account just given.

If you are more interested in how grammars are evaluated, this is a big topic in computational linguistics. Perhaps more on this in a future blog post.


Coming to terms with language


A common theme running through the last couple posts (part 1part 2) in this series is that common usages of words like language, information, and rules differ from the more narrow, technical senses they are often used in fields such as linguistics. In communicating their ideas to researchers outside their specific fields, specialists that make use of terms that also have common usages have to make sure the more narrow sense of terms they are using are known to their audiences. Otherwise, the conversation will break down really fast.

For example, a hypothetical stupid (maybe humorous) exchange:

Normie Norman: I'm running low on energy. I gotta get some sleep.
Egghead SmartasssteinActually... if anything, while sleeping you'll lose energy because you won't be consuming any calories. Therefore your metabolic processes [blah blah blah]

Failing to distinguish between common usages of terms and more technical usages is a pitfall for people that people that think about complex ideas can easily fall into when engaging with people that haven't done as much thinking/reading. I don't point this out to shame people for not being interested in abstractions or anything like that. Rather, this is stated as a reminder to myself as well to you, dear reader: make sure necessary terms are well understood before discussing.

In some modes of presentation, such as reading a book written for specialists, listening to a lecture, or doing something like that, the burden is on us (the listener/reader/etc.) to come up to speed on understanding how terms are used. This is reasonable, because, for example, in a manual on a particular piece of software, it would be inefficient to spell out the meanings of technical terms.

There are other resources for learning those terms, such as tutorials aimed at beginners. Good tutorials or introductions do not insult the intelligence of their readers, but they do take the time to explain relevant terms/concepts. I hope that this series falls in this category (suggestions/feedback always welcome 😀)

This issue of term use is especially pernicious for discussing things studied in the social science and humanities, where (honest) researchers aim to apply rigorous methodologies to difficult to describe questions. To make discussing some complex thing like "language" or "society" feasible, it is necessary to introduce narrower, more manageable definitions of these terms, and then say things about those the abstractions that meet those definitions. These definitions, as you may imagine, do not always line up well with common usages. Therefore, in stating facts about "language", or otherwise reporting what we have learned from "science", it is essential that we try to the best of our ability to communicate clearly what exactly we mean by our terms so we don't sound like Egghead Smartassstein in the exchange above.

In these measures, I hope that this post has succeeded in shedding more light on some particular issues (rather esoteric linguistic questions), but more generally continuing a conversation about conversations and how we can more effectively communicate interesting/useful ideas.

an informal intro to linguistics 2k18



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